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Policy configuration examples

The policies control the client's behavior, the allowed authentication algorithms and the FIDO UAF attestation types. Configuring the policies correctly requires some basic knowledge of the information needed to be included in the policy files.

The examples below provide complete and working policy examples which can be adapted based on specific needs.

Policies and Metadata

FIDO UAF policies work hand-in-hand with the FIDO UAF Metadata.

  • The metadata defines the types of authenticators and their capabilities.
  • The policy defines which authenticators are allowed for a specific operation.

Application Attestation

nevisFIDO can attest that the FIDO UAF client is a trusted application (see Application Attestation for details). To enable this feature you must add an extension on each authenticator for which you want to perform application attestation. The extension is different for Android and for iOS.

If no extension is defined, then it is assumed that no application attestation must be done.

Android Application Attestation Extension

The extension to require application attestation for Android authenticators is the following:

Android application attestation extenstion
{
"id": "ch.nevis.auth.fido.uaf.android-app-attestation-policy",
"data": "{ \"allowed_package_names\": [ \"my.application.packagename\" ] }"
}
AttributeDescriptionOptional
idThe extension identifier. Its value must be ch.nevis.auth.fido.uaf.android-app-attestation-policyfalse
dataStringified JSON, that can have a single attribute (allowed_package_names).true
data.allowed_package_namesAn array of package names. Only the applications with the specified package names will be accepted. If not specified, all the applications defined in the facets will be accepted.true

iOS Application Attestation Extension

The extension to require Application Attestation for iOS authenticators is the following:

iOS application attestation extenstion
{
"id": "ch.nevis.auth.fido.uaf.ios-app-attestation-policy",
"data": "{ \"allowed_bundle_ids\": [ \"my.application.bundleid\" ], \"allowed_environments\": [ \"development\", \"production\" ] }"
}
AttributeDescriptionOptional
idThe extension identifier. Its value must be ch.nevis.auth.fido.uaf.ios-app-attestation-policyfalse
dataStringified JSON, it can have two attributes: allowed_bundle_ids and allowed_environments.true
data.allowed_bundle_idsAn array of bundle IDs. Only the applications with the specified bundle IDs will be accepted. If not specified, all the applications defined in the facets will be accepted.true
data.allowed_environmentsAn array of allowed environments, use development to allow applications using a development (or test) environment, and production for applications with production environment. If not specified, applications of any environment will be accepted.true

Android Key Attestation Verification Extension

The ch.nevis.auth.fido.uaf.android-key-attestation-verifications extension provides fine-grained control over Android key attestation checks when using Full Basic Attestation. It is added to the exts array of a MatchCriteria object.

The data field must be a JSON-stringified single configuration object or an array of configuration objects. When an array is provided, validation succeeds if the device matches any of the entries (OR logic) — enabling support for multiple device types (e.g. stock Android and GrapheneOS) within a single policy.

Android key attestation verification extension
{
"id": "ch.nevis.auth.fido.uaf.android-key-attestation-verifications",
"fail_if_unknown": false,
"data": "{\"verifiedBootState\":[\"VERIFIED\"],\"requireDeviceLocked\":true,\"minKeymasterVersion\":2,\"keymasterSecurityLevel\":[\"TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT\",\"STRONG_BOX\"]}"
}
FieldTypeDescriptionOptional
idstringThe extension identifier. Its value must be ch.nevis.auth.fido.uaf.android-key-attestation-verifications.false
fail_if_unknownbooleanWhether to fail if the extension is unknown to the client. Should be set to false.true
datastringJSON-stringified single configuration object or array of configuration objects (OR logic).true
data.keymasterSecurityLevelstring[]Allowed Keymaster/KeyMint security levels. Allowed values: "TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT", "STRONG_BOX". If omitted, the check is skipped.true
data.minKeymasterVersionintegerMinimum required Keymaster/KeyMint version. Allowed values: 1, 2, 3, 4 (Keymaster) or 100, 200, 300, 400 (KeyMint). The actual version must be ≥ this value. If omitted, the check is skipped.true
data.verifiedBootStatestring[]Allowed verified boot states. Allowed values: "VERIFIED", "SELF_SIGNED", "UNVERIFIED". "FAILED" is never allowed. If omitted, the check is skipped.true
data.requireDeviceLockedbooleanIf true, the device must report itself as locked. If omitted or false, the check is skipped.true
data.verifiedBootKeysstring[]Allowed boot key hashes (base16-encoded). Used for custom ROMs such as GrapheneOS. If omitted, the check is skipped.true
data.applicationPackageNamesstring[]Allowed Android application package names (e.g. "ch.nevis.accessapp"). If omitted, the check is skipped.true
data.minOsVersionintegerMinimum required Android OS version as integer in the form AAABCC (e.g. 150000 for Android 15.0.0). If omitted, the check is skipped.true
data.minOsPatchLevelinteger[2]Minimum required OS patch level as [year, month] (e.g. [2025, 9] for September 2025). If omitted, the check is skipped.true
data.permissiveModeEnabledbooleanIf true, attestation check failures are only logged as warnings and do not cause registration to fail. Defaults to false if omitted. See permissive mode.true
Interaction with attestationTypes

This extension is designed for Full Basic Attestation. The attestationTypes field in the MatchCriteria is not required — the presence of the extension itself signals that Full Basic is expected. If a device registers with Surrogate Basic Attestation when this extension is present, registration fails. This failure is not treated as a misconfiguration and can be suppressed by setting permissiveModeEnabled: true in the extension data.

Pre-built example policy files are provided in the conf/policy directory of the nevisFIDO installation. See the examples in the Policy Examples section below.

The use of this policy extension requires your mobile application to use Android Mobile Authentication SDK 4.4.0 and later.

Attestation Algorithms EC / RSA

Whilst iOS is consistently using Elliptic Curve as attestation validation algorithm, Android supports both RSA and Elliptic Curve. The usage of RSA is a legacy option, we recommend using Elliptic Curve by default as it is considered more secure.

The algorithm(s) to be used are identified by the authenticationAlgorithms entry:

  • 2 represents Elliptic Curve (ALG_SIGN_SECP256K1_ECDSA_SHA256_DER, recommended)
  • 9 represents RSA (ALG_SIGN_RSASSA_PSS_SHA256_DER)

Without explicitly enforcing one algorithm via the policy, the Nevis Access App and SDK will use Elliptic Curve by default.

Full Basic / Surrogate Basic Attestation

The FIDO UAF attestation types are identified by the attestationType entry:

  • 15879 represents Full Basic Attestation
  • 15880 represents Surrogate Basic Attestation

For an overview of the attestation types visit our concept guide. For Android key attestation verification checks, see the Android Key Attestation Verification Extension section above.

Full Basic - Android only

Full Basic Attestation is only supported for Android authenticators using the Nevis Mobile Authentication SDK and Access App. Customers using / implementing their own authenticators with their own metadata could still use Full Basic attestation depending on the client implementation.

Functional adaptations of the UAF specification

To support both FIDO UAF Surrogate and Full Basic Attestation, the nevisFIDO component is using an adapted implementation parting from the UAF specification.

Policy Examples

By using the dynamic policy feature you have fine-granular control over what policy is to be used in which scenario.

Use this flexibility to differentiate between registration and authentication policies if needed. For example in migration scenarios, where you want existing user registrations to continue to work even when done with an algorithm or attestation type, that you do not want to use anymore for new registrations.

The following policy allows all available authenticators for both the Android and iOS platform:

Policy configuration example for allowing all authenticators
{
"accepted": [
[
{
"aaid": ["F1D0#0001"]
}
],
[
{
"aaid": ["F1D0#0002"]
}
],
[
{
"aaid": ["F1D0#0003"]
}
],
[
{
"aaid": ["F1D0#0004"]
}
],
[
{
"aaid": ["F1D0#0005"]
}
],
[
{
"aaid": ["F1D0#1001"]
}
],
[
{
"aaid": ["F1D0#1002"]
}
],
[
{
"aaid": ["F1D0#1003"]
}
],
[
{
"aaid": ["F1D0#1004"]
}
],
[
{
"aaid": ["F1D0#1005"]
}
]
]
}
Additional documentation

Refer to the official FIDO UAF Policy and UAF Match Criteria specifications.